Received 22.11.2024, Revised 21.02.2025, Accepted 27.03.2025

Experimental auction design: Enhancing procurement efficiency in Ukraine’s healthcare sector

Yurii Ivashuk, Oleksandr Dluhopolskyi, Ivan Pikh

The relevance of this study arises from the urgent need to optimise resource allocation and improve procurement procedures in Ukraine’s healthcare sector, particularly under martial law conditions, which underscore the importance of efficient and transparent use of financial resources. This study aimed to conduct a comprehensive investigation and objective assessment of the effectiveness of auction-based mechanisms for procuring medical equipment within the Ukrainian healthcare system, taking into account the specific features of the sector. A comprehensive approach was employed, including systemic and comparative analysis of existing auction models and their implementation in the healthcare systems of various countries. Using methods of formalisation and generalisation, an experimental auction model was developed, incorporating multi-attribute evaluation. Statistical methods enabled a quantitative analysis of the proposed model’s effectiveness. The findings indicated that introducing auction mechanisms into Ukraine’s healthcare procurement system holds significant potential for enhancing the efficiency and transparency of medical equipment procurement. The developed experimental model of multi-attribute evaluation, combined with a sealed-bid auction format, allows for the consideration of not only price but also other important criteria, such as the technical specifications of the equipment, warranty period, service conditions, and the presence of additional benefits. A detailed analysis was conducted to assess the impact of each of these factors on auction outcomes. The study demonstrated that the proposed approach enables the selection of suppliers offering the best overall value, considering the balance between cost and quality of medical equipment. The research findings make a significant contribution to the advancement of both the theory and practice of auction applications in the healthcare sector, broadening the understanding of how auction mechanisms function within the medical field 

tender bidding; medicine; experiment; healthcare; efficiency; price; quality
63-70
Ivashuk, Yu., Dluhopolskyi, О., & Pikh, I. (2025). Experimental auction design: Enhancing procurement efficiency in Ukraine’s healthcare sector. Innovation and Sustainability, 5(1), 63-70. https://doi.org/10.63341/vis/1.2025.63

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